Introduction
M edical experts frequently use imaging studies to illustrate points in their court testimony. On the one hand, the apparent "objective" evidence provided by such imaging studies can lend strong credence to a medical expert, increasing the weight given to an expert opinion by a judge or jury. On the other hand, as the court usually has no specialized scientific expertise, the use of complex images as part of courtroom testimony also has the potential to mislead or at least inappropriately bias the weight given to expert evidence. Indeed, this topic provided heated debate among functional imaging specialists at the American Pain Society Forensic Special Interest Group meeting of 2005, and some offered ominous predictions of inappropriate use of a "lie detector" for chronic pain syndromes. Subsequently, others in the legal community have questioned the use of functional imaging techniques in international legal settings, commenting that "researchers, funded by the Department of Defense, have developed technologies that may render the 'dark art' of interrogation unnecessary." [1, 2] The judicial system has been aware of this potential problem for many decades, and a number of case opinions and academic reviews have considered both the standards and the criteria the court should use when assessing the admissibility of medical imaging data. Judicial opinions and commentary have repeatedly expressed caution against the potential inappropriate use of such studies to manipulate judicial opinions [3, 4] .
Recent advances in brain imaging may have a profound impact on forensic expert testimony. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other physiologic imaging techniques currently allow visualization of the activation pattern of brain regions associated with a wide variety of cognitive and behavioral tasks. FMRI is also relatively noninvasive and has few attendant risks, permitting repeated measurements in a broad range of human applications. Not surprisingly, fMRI research on pain and related cognitive processing has been accompanied by pressure to expand the role of brain imaging as forensic evidence, in an effort to provide the court with a "crystal ball" that might answer fundamental legal questions regarding an individual's credibility, intent, perception, mental set, and even their "moral integrity." [5, 6] Faigman et al. [7] warned, however, that "the jury, generally unsophisticated in science, is in danger of being swayed by the credentials or impressiveness of the witness rather than the true worth of the data . . ." Despite the current widespread enthusiasm concerning the applications of fMRI, the authors caution that the scientific and forensic issues involved are highly complex, and they believe that the use of fMRI data in the courtroom should be approached with great care. fMRI fMRI is a relatively recent imaging technique that aims to determine the neurobiological correlate of behavior by identifying the brain regions (or "functioning modules") that become "active" during the performance of specific tasks. In addition, the noninvasive and relative safety of the technique allows a subject to undergo repeated studies so that important questions, such as the relationship between experience-dependent use and changes in brain structure or function, can be addressed [8] [9] [10] [11] . This makes fMRI a very interesting and potentially important tool for studying pain processing [10, 12, 13] .
The local increase in energy requirements, arising as a consequence of neuronal firing, is largely met through an increase in oxygen-based metabolism, with the increased demand for oxygen being delivered seconds later by an increase in the local blood flow (the hemodynamic response). With the presence of this increased energy requirement, oxygen extraction is maximized into the tissues, resulting in the presence of blood deoxygenation, and that resulting deoxygenated hemoglobin, being paramagnetic, is a "blood oxygen level dependent" or BOLD [14, 15] effect that can be observed by MRI technology. With standard neurophysiological testing paradigms in pain research, stimuli of varying types (noxious vs non-noxious) are applied, with noninvolved areas of the body serving as controls. By subtracting the brain regions recruited during the performance of the control task from the brain regions recruited during the test condition, the areas of the brain, whose activity is associated specifically with pain processing, can be identified.
A more fundamental issue is interpretation; that is, it is not the neuronal response that is monitored directly, but a "physiological correlate" or "marker, the hemodynamic response. The hemodynamic response (occurring over seconds) is much slower than the neuronal response (occurring over tens to hundreds of milliseconds). fMRI makes indirect use of this local need for bloodflow to image the regions of the brain recruited into the activated neural network.
Standards for Expert Testimony
The first major effort to define legal standards for admissible expert testimony in federal court occurred in the 1920s. In Frye v. United States [16, 17] , the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided that expert testimony about the results of a primitive "lie detector" test was inadmissible. This decision set the legal standard for scientific evidence with the statement:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to determine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go longwinded getting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. [16] The Frye standard of "general acceptance" grew in importance with the development of forensic science. The issue reached center stage in the 1960s, with the Surgeon General's report linking cigarette smoking with lung cancer [18] [19] [20] . The major social, economic, and regulatory impact of that finding threw a spotlight on the importance of legal standards for what constituted "acceptable" scientific evidence [21, 22] .
The Frye principle of "general acceptance" by itself was notably both vague and inadequate. The Frye standard left open exactly who was responsible for "generally accepting" scientific evidence. Perhaps more importantly, however, it failed to consider the validity of scientific evidence outside of its popularity.
The 1975 revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence partially addressed this problem [23] . Rule 702 defined standards for testimony by experts in federal court, stating:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Rule 702 went beyond the Frye standard, emphasizing that admissible testimony must have "Reasonable reliability . . . based upon principles or methodology which is reasonably reliable." In other words, Rule 702 emphasized that expert testimony needed to be more than "generally accepted"; it also needed to be scientifically valid. This was, of course, no small point.
In 1993 the United States Supreme Court issued a major landmark opinion regarding the standards for expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [17, 18, 24] , and physicians have repeatedly encountered this ruling in with the use of imaging in medicolegal practice [4, 25] . Indeed, pain physicians have not been immune to Daubert challenges in court [26] . This decision reaffirmed Rule 702 over the Frye standard, changing the emphasis from "general acceptance" to "proof of reliability" (scientific validity).
In providing guidance to the courts, the factors to be considered when evaluating expert testimony are:
1. Whether the theory can be or has been tested, that is, has it been tested to determine if it can be falsified? 2. Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. 3. What is the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation. 4. Whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted by the scientific community to which it belongs [26, 27] .
The court also emphasized that the admissibility of scientific testimony was based not only on its validity and reliability, but also on its relevance to the issue in question (in other words, the "fit" and "weight" of the evidence to a particular case are important). The Supreme Court also gave trial judges "gatekeeper" responsibility, charged with determining the admissibility of expert evidence at trial.
Expert evidence based on imaging studies should only be admitted by the court when it is both relevant and not unduly prejudicial. These two evidentiary criteria are termed "fit" and "weight." [18] On the one hand, "Fit" refers to a consideration of how a particular piece of scientific evidence actually relates to the particular question before the court. On the other hand, the concept of "weight" refers to the degree to which a particular piece of evidence influences the court's judgment.
The Supreme Court opinion in Daubert considers the concept of Fit in expert testimony at some length. Not surprisingly, the court held that admissible expert testimony must be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." [24] However, in addition, such testimony is only admissible if it has "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry," and efforts to extrapolate from laboratory-based fMRI data likely may prove to be difficult and a formidable challenge. The court would be expected to vet these important issues with respect to fMRI in a formal hearing, as other imaging techniques have been challenged in court. Once, medicolegal case involving positron emission tomography (PET) imaging dealt with the claim of headaches and dizziness caused by a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff claimed a traumatic brain injury and asserted that PET results supported the claim. Earlier cases supported a role for PET scanning in courts, while the judge supported the defense, he wrote that the scientific evidence was not applicable in the second case.
In order for expert testimony to "Fit," it is important to establish that "reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue," and this was found to be lacking in the above case. In other words, expert testimony must be based on valid scientific fact and principles, and the extent to which those issues "can be related, by a credible theory, to the issue at hand."
Even when evidence is relevant and "fits," however, a court must also assess the "weight" the evidence may have in a specific case. In other words, whether the probative value of the evidence is "substantially outweighed" by the possibility that such evidence will unfairly bias the jury and lead to a decision based on prejudice or emotion rather than reason. This consideration of probative value vs prejudicial effect is especially germane to fMRI data presented in court, where colorful computerized brain images are particularly prone to misinterpretation by jurors [28, 29] .
In this context, it is important to emphasize that fMRI images do not directly index brain activity. The BOLD effect merely measures changes in regional brain oxygen utilization, which combines changes in blood flow and oxygen extraction. As the brain is highly dependent on oxidative metabolism, under controlled circumstances, oxygen utilization appears to parallel regional neuronal activation in normal brain. However, there are few reasons to believe that this correlation will prove reliable in the relative unsanitary surroundings of forensic evidence. The effects of drugs and illness are also likely to impact the changes observed with fMRI studies.
Social Influences
There are other significant reasons to fear that social and political factors will influence the introduction and acceptance of fMRI data as courtroom evidence. For example, on November 13, 2002, United States Assistant Attorney General Deborah Daniels delivered an address to the American Society of Criminology's 54th Annual Meeting titled "The Future is Now: Reducing Victimization Through Advances in Criminal Justice Techniques." [30] After discussing airport security issues associated with the 9-11 terrorist attack, she stated:
I read an article just this past weekend in a Knight Ridder newspaper, quoting scientists at the University of Pennsylvania as saying that brain scan technology now exists that can reveal when a person recognizes a familiar face, no matter how hard he tries to conceal it. The technology is referred to as a "functional MRI", and apparently has the potential not only to function as a lie detector, but even, according to one scientist, could "be used to pick up brain abnormalities that he says characterize [persons who are] prone to violence.
The article made it clear that, while such technology would be exceedingly helpful in criminal interrogations, its potential for mining the deepest thoughts of individuals is, potentially, frightening. We must continue to keep in mind that, "while we believe our primary obligation is to protect the public from predators, it is critical that we do so in a way that respects privacy and individual liberties." Despite this last cautionary statement, she next discusses the fact that "new technology is absolutely critical" in order to respond to the terrorist threat in the United States.
The fact that a United States Assistant Attorney General appeared to endorse the forensic use of fMRI based solely on a newspaper article she had recently read should raise significant concerns in the scientific community. These concerns are reinforced by the fact that she uses political arguments concerning the threat of terrorism to support her belief that such technology is "absolutely critical," without apparent regard to the underlying scientific foundation.
In that context, the authors are aware of only one written opinion of the United States Supreme Court that refers directly to fMRI. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court offered an opinion on a highly emotional issue: whether capital punishment was an appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender. Kevin Nigel Stanford was under 18 years old when he committed a crime that resulted in a death penalty verdict. In 1989 the verdict was appealed on constitutional grounds. In a split decision, the Supreme Court refused to review Stanford's case and rejected his writ of habeas corpus [31] . Thirteen years later, Stanford appealed his case again to the Supreme Court, petitioning for a stay of execution. Once again the Supreme Court rejected a review of his case.
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented [32] . In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens made a series of arguments against capital punishment for juvenile offenses. A fundamental argument was that the brains of children and adolescents are different and immature; biologically they should not be held to the same standard as adults in society. Supporting this view, Justice Stevens states:
Neuroscientific evidence of the last few years has revealed that adolescent brains are not fully developed, which often leads to erratic behaviors and thought processes in that age group . . . scientific advances such as the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging-MRI scans-have provided valuable data that serve to make the case even stronger that adolescents "are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less disciplined than adults."
Justice Stevens appears to endorse the value of fMRI as forensic evidence regarding complex cognitive issues such as decision-making, impulse control, and maturational understanding. However, the dissenting opinion In re Stanford offers no primary citations or direct references that would provide a foundation for this interpretation. Once again, the substantial social issues involved with the legal execution of minors undoubtedly fuel the court's interest in possible objective testing that could assist in such critical determinations.
Although terrorism and capital punishment for juvenile offenders are both extremely serious social issues, such cases are not common. In contrast, the court is very frequently asked to make critical determinations concerning impairment and disability in patients with chronic pain. The evaluation and management of chronic pain patients are often a difficult, multidisciplinary problem, even for highly skilled clinicians. For most patients with common, well-recognized chronic or recurrent pain syndromes, complaints of pain and the degree of behavioral disruption have little correlation with evidence of objective tissue damage or nociception. Many highly skilled clinicians resort to the practical, but meaningless, definition that "pain is what the patient says it is and exists when the patient says it does" [33] . In this setting, it is no surprise that courts frequently express frustration over contradictory testimonies and often reach apparently arbitrary and conflicting rulings. Hence, there is an inherent temptation to reach for techniques that could "objectify" the construct of pain.
Pain experts are commonly asked to offer opinions about the extent to which low back pain contributes to impairment and disability in a specific case. As part of their testimony, experts frequently use MRI images of a patient's lumbar spine. Images that show degenerative bony changes are often considered "objective" evidence supporting a patient's claims of pain, impairment, and resultant disability. Conversely, a normal lumbar MRI is frequently used to discredit a patient's pain complaints. However, virtually all pain clinicians are aware that there is actually very poor, if any, scientific correlation between the extent of lumbar degenerative spine changes and an individual's pain complaints or pain-related disability Although an expert may provide a scientifically accurate and detailed description of the images, such testimony may not actually address the issue before the court.
This issue is clearly stated by United States District Judge William D. Quarles Jr. in a memorandum opinion offered in Smith v. Continental Casualty [34] . Smith claimed disability and functional impairment associated with chronic back pain and degenerative spine disease. Continental Casualty denied his disability claim, based in part on their determination that "a diagnosis of total impairment is not reasonable on the basis of Mr. Smith's self-reported complaints." In his analysis of the case, Judge Quarles makes the following observation:
No test can measure how much pain a person feels. Indeed, each person's experience of pain is unique. To the Black Knight, the traumatic amputation of both arms seems "just a flesh wound." To another, a pinprick causes a cascade of tears. Recent scientific research has even uncovered a physiologic basis for individual differences in pain sensitivity (footnote). Pain, moreover, often persists despite ignorance of its precise etiology.
Judge Quarles' footnote references a Web page containing a press release that discusses fMRI and pain [35] . The issues raised in Smith v. Continental Casualty are very important and are also very common. Judge Quarles' opinion reflects the social pressure to accept scientific testimony about pain even in the absence of a rigorous scientific foundation.
Advances in fMRI imaging will greatly add to the complexity of this issue. Recent findings reported in the medical literature have received increasing attention. For example, a report by Spence titled "A cognitive neurobiological account of deception: Evidence from functional imaging" [5, 6, 37 ] and Langleben's "Telling truth from lie in individual subjects with fast eventrelated fMRI" [38, 39] have received widespread attention from the popular press, and they surely can be expected to reference in future court proceedings. Several research studies also provide evidence that fMRI findings may reliably correlate with the nature or magnitude of an individual's subjective experience of pain. Recently, the technique has been applied to a number of clinical chronic pain disorders, including fibromyalgia [40, 41] , chronic low back pain [42, 43] , and neuropathic pain [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] , in an effort to define central mechanisms that may contribute to subjective pain symptoms in those disorders. The findings with fMRI parallel other advances in the imaging of brain regions involved in central pain processing that have been made with PET [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] and magnetoencephalopathy [36, 49, [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] .
The techniques of fMRI may also prove an important tool for the evaluation of psychological conditions and cognitive activity that have potential direct bearing on the clinical nature of pain complaints, such as hysterical anesthesia [63] . Many legal judgments pivot on the basic issues of an individual's credibility, intent, cognitive process, perception, and even his or her moral integrity [64] . Several reports suggest that fMRI may provide the court with objective data on these issues [3, 29] , while these may be tempered by studies that suggest that merely imagining pain may result in changes shown on fMRI [65] .
Conclusions
fMRI is a powerful tool for research on how different brain regions are engaged during complex neural functions. The technology holds great promise for medical research and clinical management. At the same time, many opinions have emerged arguing that the technology has multiple potential applications that can be utilized to address legal and social issues. On the one hand, many of these opinions show a simplistic understanding of the real issues, and a number of the claims may appear humorous. These include assertions that fMRI can provide an objective test-marketing tool for companies to evaluate consumer responses to new products, and even claims that the technology can demonstrate fMRI differences between Republicans and Democrats, and therefore might be useful for political strategists. On the other hand, a number of opinions about current or potential fMRI applications are considerably more serious. As noted earlier, United States Assistant Attorney General Deborah Daniels endorsed fMRI as a future important tool for the criminal justice system and emphasized the development of such new technology in the context of the war on terror. Several groups have also discussed the use of this technology for interrogation purposes, objective documentation of a person's sexual preference, or risk screening for individuals who may be prone to violence or terrorist acts. Concern over such issues may be warranted.
It is also worth noting that in recent years, substantial portions of the Defense Department's medical budget have been earmarked for fMRI research. The amount invested in "classified" research and direct fMRI applications is secret, and not available, perhaps because of government secrecy issues. These developments are not surprising. Although there are many discussions and legal guidelines about the use of scientific knowledge and technological advances in the legal process, social and political pressures often strongly influence the legal adoption or interpretation of scientific data.
History is full of examples where the legal system gives credence to supposed tests or objective signs that are fundamentally without foundation but fueled by the social and political agenda. The fervor to discover and eliminate heresy in medieval Europe was codified in the Malleus maleficarum (1486), which included multiple tests to prove witchcraft and demonic possession. The testing provided the justification and zeal for widespread use of torture over 200 years.
In the United States, the Salem witch trials provided an early example of social influence on "objective" expert evidence in court. Cotton Mather (graduate of Boston Latin School and Harvard Class of 1678) wrote a letter to the judges in the case, who were also his personal friends. Mather made recommendations about how the court should approach evidentiary issues at the trials, and he urged the judges to consider "spectral evidence," and to "give it such weight as it will bear."
By present day analogy, many state court judges have resisted application of the Daubert standards, many supposed pain experts have free reign with use of imaging techniques that offer little in the way of adequate reliability or validity [28] . Pain specialists often blindly rely on imaging to draw their conclusions. Even the most impressive find from a diagnostic image requires cross validation with other objective modes of assessment. When one enters the realm of pain, cognitive processes necessarily make the assessment process more complex. Thoughts, intentions, and patient suffering confound what we are purporting to measure by fMRI. We must extrapolate in such circumstances and make a priori judgments about what we are claiming to measure. Data from fMRI technology may offer us intriguing hints about these higher level cognitive processes in the future, yet they are only hints.
